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Recent theories of economic geographysuggestthat fums in the same industry may be
drawn to the same locations because proximity generates positive externalities or "agglomeration
effects." Under this view, chance events and government inducements can have a lasting
influence on the geographical pauern of manufacturing. However, most evidence on the causes
and magnitude of industry localization has been based on stories, rather than statistics. This
paper examines the location choices of 751 Japanese manufacturing plants built in the U.S. since
1980. Conditional logit estimates support the hypothesis that industry-level agglomeration
benefits play an important role in location decisions.
Keith Head John Ries
Faculty of Commerce Faculty of Commerce
University of British Columbia University of British Columbia
2053 Main Mall 2053 Main Mall







Firms in the same industry tendtocluster inparticularregions. White this observation is
notnovel,ithas becomethe basis fora number of recent formalmodels.Economists have
proposedagglomeration effects in the form of both pecuniary and technological externalities
to explain industry localization. However, empirical work in this area has yet to establish
the pervasiveness of externalities based on geographical proximity. Furthermore, we have little
idea of the distances over which such effects operate. The recent influx of hundreds of new
manufacturing plants from Japan into the U.S.providesa unique opportunity to study the
location decision, It also raises the new issue of whether agglomeration effects, to the extent
that they exist, operate on a nationality-specific basis.
Empirical information on these issues is partictiarly important for the design of policies
aimed at attracting manufacturing investment. For instance, if agglomeration is at least partly
nationality-specific, a locality with a sparse U.S.manufacturingbase might find it easier to
develop its manufacturing sector by attracting foreign affiliates than by attracting U.S.invest-
ment. Moreover, the existence of agglomeration externalities that spill across official borders
will alter the payoffs of local goveninients competing for investment.
This paper estimates a location choice model using data on Japanese investors who estab-
lished new manufacturing plants in the United States. We find that the Japanese ventures do
not simply mimic the geographical pattern of U.S. establishments in their industry. Instead,
initial investments by Japanesefirmsspur subsequent investors in the same 'industry or indus-
trial group toselectthe same states. Wearguethat this pattern of location choice supportsan
agglomeration-externalities theory of industry localizationratherthan a theory based on inter-
state differencesinendowments of natural resources, labour, and infrastructure. Moreover, we
find that the geographic extent of manufacturing agglomeration does not end at state borders;
1the attractivcnessof a state increaseswith the level of industrial activity in neighbouring states.
Theoretical analysis has developed various explanations for manufacturing agglomeration.
The early work of Marshall (1920) provides three compelling reasons for spatially concentrated
industries: Localization provides a pooled market for workers with specialized skills, facilitates
the development of specialized inputs and services, and enables firms to benefit from technolog-
ical spillovers. Recent papers by David and Rosenbloozn (1990) and Krugman (1991a, 1991b)
have constructed formal models to analyze and extend these concepts.
There have been few empirical studies of agglomeration effects. Hnon (1986) examines
data for the United States and Brazil and finds strong evidence that industry localization raises
factor productivity. Glaeser et al (1992) do not find a positive relationship between industry
concentration and city employment growth. Instead, they attribute city growth to Industry
diversity and competition. They posit that the lack of dynamic agglomeration effects may arise
because their sample consists of mature industries.
Previous studies of the investment location decision generally use a measure of aggregate
manufacturing activity as an explanatory variable. Recent studies of this type include Wheeler
and Mody (1992), Woodward (1992), Coughlin et al (1991), and Schmenner et al (1987). They
find that firms are drawn to regions with heavy manufacturing activity. The few studies of
industry-level location choice have focused on a limited set of industries. Carlton's (1983)
study of domestic finns and Luger and Shetty's (1985) study of foreign firms find evidence of
industry-level effects in three specific industries. Smith and Florida (1992) study the invest-
ments of Japanese auto-related parts suppliers and show that they tend to locate near Japanese
assembly plants and prefer areas with greater aggregate manufacturing activity. Past studies do
notquately distinguish between endowment and industry-level agglomeration effects. Man-
ufacturing activity is likely to be correlated with a number of unmeasured factors favourable to
2specific locations: thus, the coefficient measuring the attractive power of manufacturing activity
partly captures the effect of unobservedendowments.
This study contributes to understanding industry agglomeration in a number ways. We ex-
plicitly account for state-specific effects (including overall manufacturing activity) by employing
state-specific constants. This should capture a number of sources of unobserved variation be-
tween states. Our study comprises investments in 225 different 4-digit manufacturing industries.
For each investment, the geographical pattern of U.S. establishments in its industry serves as
a control for industry-specific location factors. We argue that Japanese deviations from this
pattern suggest agglomeration effects. in addition we examine whether znemben of Japanese
industrial groups—known as *eiretsu—tend to cluster geographically. Since these affiliations
often involve the subcontracting of components and other less tangible ties, a tendency for their
members to cluster would offer additional evidence of agglomeration. Finally, we allow the
attractiveness of a state to depend on its own industry clusters as well as those in bordering
states.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section II presents several theoretical accounts
of agglomeration externalities and the alternative theory that we refer to as endowment-driven
localization. Section III describes our research design, the main hypothesis we test and al-
ternative hypotheses we consider. Section IV discusses the data set and the construction of
agglomeration measures. Presentation of econometric results follows in Section V. This section
employs a simulation to assess the strength of the estimated agglomeration effects. We conclude
with a summary of the major results and a discussion of their potential policy implications.
3II THEORIES OF LOCALIZATION
Localization, the geographic concentration of particular industries, could arise through a variety
of mechanisms. The general category we are interested in, agglomeration effects, includes all
economies that are an increasing function of the number of nearby firms. The cumulative loca-
tion choices that constitute the process of agglomeration allow accidents of history to influence
the long-run geographical pattern of industry. Local expansion of a sector sows the seeds for
further expansion by increasing the supply of the factor that made the location attractive in the
first place, rather than simply bidding up the price of a given stock. Theoreticalattempts to
formalize agglomeration effects have focused on three mechanisms that would yield such positive
feedback loops: inter-fit-ni technological spillovers, specialized labor, and intermediate inputs.
The vague and general concept of technological spiflovers is probably the most frequently
invoked source of agglomeration effects. tTscfui technical information seems to flow between
entrepreneurs designers, and engineers in a variety of industries. A large part of the spillovers
between foreign-owited fijins may include the flow of experience-basedknowledge on how to
operate efficiently in a given state) Physical proximity may enhance knowledge flows by mA-
ing casual communication less costly. Since technological spillovers axe usually impossible to
measure, we know little about the geographical extent of these spillovers, the degree to which
they operate within industries versus between industries, and the extent to whichthey flow
between firms of different national origins. While the prosperity of thehigh-tecbnolo cluster
in Silicon Valley and the high-fashion cluster in Milanmay arise from local knowledge spiUoven,
less ephemeral stories involving specialized labour andparts may play equally important roles.
As indicated by Marshalj localized industry createsa pooled market for workers with. ape-
Example, of such information would iuclude experience. with meeting localgovernment regulations, adopting to the localclimate andlabout- force, sad low-cost transportation options.
4cialized skills. This ant-acts workers for two reasons. First, as argued by David and Rosenbloom
(1990), if the fortunes of individual firmsarenot perfectly correlated, the spatial concentration
of industry is advantageous to laid-off workers who will be able to find new jobs with other firms.
Hence, an increased numberoffirms reduces the likelihood that a worker will suffer a long bout
of unemployment. This reduced risk will ultimately benefit the firms as well by increasing the
supply of specialized labour and reducing the risk premium embodied in the wage. Rotemberg
and Saloner (1990) propose what could be seen as a complementary effect. Workers in a given
location will be more inclined to invest in industry-specific human capital if they feel confident
of their ability to appropriate the benefits. A monopsony situation might allow the employer to
capture the benefits instead. Thus, by mitigating the hold-up problem, agglomeration generates
the development of more industry-specific skills.
Krugman (1991b) argues that the combination of scale economies and moderate transporta-
tion costs will encourage the users and suppliers of intennediate inputs to cluster near each
other. Such agglomerations reduce total transportation costs and generate large enough lev-
els of demand to warrant efforts to produce highly specialized components. This will attract
assemblers which in turn encourages new arrivals and additional specialization.
The "just-in-time" inventory system employed by many Japanese manufacturers raises the
total cost of transporting parts because it requires flexible and punctual deliveries. Due to the
importance this system places on reliability and trust, it may also encourage specialization in
the form of long-term relationships. These arguments suggest that agglomeration effects will
exert a particularly strong influence on Japanese manufacturers as they attempt to transplant
their production systems to North America.
While recent theoretical work has concentrated on agglomeration models of industry local-
ization, a simple alternative hypothesis, endowment-driven localization, draws on traditional
5trade theory. The latter theory argues that industries will concentrate in regions with favor-
able factorendowments.For instance,sawmills might congregate in a particular state to take
advantage of its abundant supply of high quality timber. A broad view of factor-endowments
wouldinclude man-made inputs whosesupply is not affected by the output ofanyparticular
Jndustr'.
inboththeoriesof localization, firms in the same industry cluster geographically; however,
only in the presence ofagglomerationexternalities does the clustering addtothe attractive-
ness of the location. For instance the existence of an immobile and exogenously supplied input
wouldtendto attract investment fromindustriesthat use that input intensively. However, as
firms congregate, the location becomes less attractive since competition among users bids up
the price of the input. A corresponding phenomena could occur on the demand side if exoge-
nous forces had promoted the concentration of downstream demand for a particular industry.
These considerations suggest an important difference between the theories: agglomeration ben-
efits could result in two states with identical endowments receiving very different shares of the
investment in any particular industry. This study will estimate the magnitude of industry-level
agglomeration effects and assess their importance in location decisions.
III Research Design
We model the location decision of Japanese manufacturing plants as a conditional logit prob-
lem where the dependent variable is the state chosen by each investor. Following the method
employed in earlier studies such as Carlton (1983) and Bartili (1985), we exploit McFadden's
(1974) result that logit choice probabilities may be derived from individual maximization de-
cisions if unobserved heterogeneity takes the appropriate form.Weassume that each investor
chooses the state that would yield the highest profit. Profits depend on the availability of inputs
6that enter inthe firms production function which include agglomeration effects stemming from
nearbyeconomicactivityofsimilarfirms. Idiosyncratic shocks, denoted c11,also affect profits
butthey are not observed by the econometrician. As derived in the appendix, the profitability
of state a for investor j may be represented as
8,+cxrglnA7,5+crjin A], +aehiA +€,,, (1)
where 8, captures the attractiveness of state a to the "average' (orrepresentative) investor
and45, A],,andA%are agglomeration variablesmeasuredas counts of U.S., Japanese, and
Group (keiretsu) establishments.Eachmeasure varies across investors,j, since investorsdiffer
byindustry, Leiretsumembership,and time of entry.Thestate effect reflectsinfrastructure, the
pricesof variable inputs such as labour,rawmaterials, andenergyas well as anyother state
characteristicimportant tothe averageJapaneseinvestor.
McFadden(1074)demonstrated that if,and onlyif,'j, is distributed as a Type I Extreme
Valueindependent randomvariablethe probability thatstatea will yieldinvestor jthehighest
profit.s amongallthestates in choice set$ isgiven by the logit expression,
exp(8, + LEA a, InA,) PrOs) =Eap(9g+EInA1)'
(2)
where 4 ={US,J, G}. Maximum likelihoodtechniquesuse these probabilities to estimate the
state-specific constants and agglomeration coefficients.
Our use of state effects contrasts with the approach taken by previous studies of location
decisions in manufacturing in which the authors explicitly included state cha]racteristi audi
as wages, unionization rates, energy prices, and access to a major port.2 The problem with
'Friedman ct at (1992) isarecent example.It provides a tabular snmmazy of result. fran, previou, work.
7that approach sterns fioni the near impossibility of selecting and correctly measuring all of
the relevantinfrastructureand input pt-ice information that affect location decisions. Omitted
sources of attractiveness would almost certainly induce a correlation between the error term and
the agglomeration variables. State effects can include influences on the location decision that
sicparticularlydifficult to measure, ranging from the strength of the work ethic in a particular
state to the quality of its golf courses.
While 9 captures the attractiveness of state stothe average investor, unobserved charac-
teristics of choosers can still make some states closer substitutes in the eyes of certain investors.
Suppose that the parametet-s of the production function vary across industries but are constant
for investments in the same 4-digit industry, in this case, firms in industries with high factor
intensities will choose states with abundant endowments of those factors. For priced inputs, low
prices will indicate abundance. This suggests that industry-level agglomeration variables wiU be
correlated with the unobserved factor conditions pertaining to that industry that constitute the
error term in our model. With a large enough data set, featuring multiple investments in each
industry, this problem could be resolved by including state-industry-specific constants. How-
ever, since our sample of 751 investments includes plants in over 200 different 4-digit industries,
this strategy is not feasible.
The use of a sample of new foreign investors—the Japanese influx during the 1980e—provides
an alternative strate' for separating agglomeration and endowment effects. The geographical
distribution of U.S. establishments in a particular industry should incorporate all therelevant
information on the abundance of endowments used intensively in that industry. Significant draw-
ing power of prior Japanese investment, after controlling for the U.S. pattern, should provide
an indication of agglomeration effects.
The empirical investigation distinguishes between alternative explanations for Japanese inca-
Stion patternsthat deviate from thoseof U.S. firmsin thesame industry. In addition to Japanese-
specific agglomeration effects, there are two primary explanations for distinctive Japanese pat-
texts. The first is that Japancse firms cluster in the same states regardless of industry for
fundamental reasons, i.e. Japanese investors might choose a state because they want to be
on the Pacific coast, or in a low-unionization state or near major population centers. These
effects would be captured by the state-specific constants. A second possibility is that Japanese
investors concentrate by industry due to systematic forms of heterogeneity that make particu-
lar locations intrinsically attractive for certain types of Japanese investment. For instance, if
a subset of investors, such as auto firms, rely disproportionately on intermediate inputs, they
would exhibit preference for states with superior transportation facilities. We attempt to weed
out such potential sources of uncontrolled-for inter-industry variation by testing the robustness
of our formulation to deletions of particular regions from the choice set and industries from the
investor set.
IV DATA
The data employed in this paper come from a survey of Japanese manufacturing investments
in the United States conducted by the Japan Economic Institute. For each plant in the sample
we know the year it began operations, the identity of the parent firm or firma, and the products
it manufactures. Since most policy discussion focuses on efforts to attract new (also known sa
"greenfield") investments, we excluded acquisitions from the sample.3
Our estimation includes investments that began operations alter 1979. The previous in-
vestments are used to form the Japanese agglomeration levels as of the beginning of i980.The
'The location modelfornew investment probably differs in important ways frot the model for acquisitions.
Since acquisitions involve changes in ownership ratherthanthecreationof new atablasliments. they have am-
biguous effects onour agglomerationmeasure,. Furthermore,while new venturamaylocate wherever they want,
acquirors an limited to the current locations of potential targets.
9smaller estimation windowrcduces potential variation in relative infrastructure levels andfactor
prices. Also, since the character of Japanese direct investment may have changed over time, this
reduces unobserved heterogeneity. Finally, the use of the later data allows for a closer match
with our U.S.data whichwas drawn from the 1982 and 1987 censuses. The post-1979 sample
dontains over 80%ofJapanese manufacturing investments in the United States.
Figure 1depictsthe geographical pattern of all greenfleld Japanese investment. Below each
value for Japanese investment we give the percentage of U.S. establishments in that state in
1982. Since the U.S. sample is constructed from the same set of 4-digit industries as the Japanese
sample, we would expect the upper and lower numbers to match very closely if there were no
special influences on the location of Japanese investment.
A number of states received no Japanese investment at all. The data in Figure 1 reveals
that those states—namely Delaware. Idaho, Montana, New Mexico, North and South Dakota,
Rhode Island and Wyoming—are quite unpopular with U.S. manufacturers as well. Conditional
logit requires that all choices be selected at least once. Consequently we removed those states
from the choice set. We further reduced the choice set by removing states (Hawaii, Louisiana,
Maine, Minnesota, New Hampshire, Utah, Vermont and West Virginia) which received fewer
than 3 investments after 1979. This reduces the number of estimated parameters by 8 while
reducing the sample by only 9 observations. Given the independence from irrelevant alternatives
assumption built into the logit specification, the reduction in the choice set should not affect
the other parameter estimates.
We estimate the effects of four types of agglomeration variable on the location choice. In
each case agglomeration is measured as a count of establishments the year before the venture be-
gan operations. We selected establishrtcounts,rather than production or employment levels,
10Figure 1: The GeographicalDistributionof Japaneseand U.S.ManufacturingEstablishmeuts
0_I
: Figure. exprcsbed as percentages o( the Japan total of 900 greenfield investments sad the U.S. total 1982 stock
tf 229292 n.aaufactuñag establishments. (iS. figures based on 1982 Census of Msaufscturiag Data for .11 4-digit
SIC industries that received some grecufield iap.uiese investment.
because that allowed us to construct equivalent measures of Japanese and U.S.agglomeration.4
The followinglist defines thefour types of agglomeration effects investigated in this study.
U.S.activity; A.5 Number of establishmentsinsame4-digitSIC. Investments that began op-
erationsbetween1980 and1984(inclusive)are matchedto1982Censusof Manufacturing
counts. Later investments are matchedtothe 1987Census.
'Data confidentiality in the U.S. Census of Manufacturing results in establishments bang the only variale
which is available for every state in every 4-digit SIC industry. there is a slight difference between the Japanese
and U.S.establishmentcounts. The (1.5. data put. each establishment in one industry. We have data on multi-
product Japanese plants which does not indicate the primary SICofthe plant. It see. reasonabl, that a urn
producing two products would care about the activity in both industries in each state. Renc., we count each
product line as a separate plant for calculating the relennt agglomeration variables. Nate, however, that we




















0.IJapan-based activity Af,Numberof plants operating in same 4-digit SIC in the year before
investmeut jbeganoperations. Source: Japan Economic Institute 1990 Updated Survey.
IndustrialGroupmember activity A5 Number of establishments in same manufacturer-
led keiretsu. Groupaffiliations werecompiledusingKigyo Keiretsu Sornn, a publication
ofToyo Keizai.
Border-State Activity: EtEo() A' where i =US,JIG. B(s) is the set of states with borders
on state s.
The two industt-y-level agglomeration variables (AUS and A") make use of the standard
industrial classification tables. We employ the relatively detailed 4-digit level of disaggregation.
These "industries" frequently lump disparate activities together but they may also separate
closely related industries. We have found several cases where the use of standard classifications
causes an understatement of Japancse industrial concentration. For instance, Japanese firms
made 41 investments in industry 3089, 'plastic parts, not elsewhere classified" However, 22 of
those plants produced plastic parts for automobiles. Of the remaining 19 plants, 32% selected
Georgia compared to 2% of all U.S. establishments in industry 3089. Machine tools provides a
case where insufficient aggregation hides the extent of agglomeration. Five of thirteen Japanese
makers of machine tools for metal cutting (SIC 3541), two of six makers of cutting tools (SIC
3545), and four of five makers of the numerical controls used for machine tools (SIC 3625) chose
illinois. While Illinois is relatively strong in each industry, it accounts for little more than 10%
of the U.S. establishments in these industries.
The last two sources of agglomeration effects, industrial groups and activities in border-
states require some additional explanation. With respect to A6, we consider only industrial or
vertical" groups; i.e. those headed by large manufacturing companies whose members consist
12largely of component suppliers. Vertical linkages are likely to be strong in these groups which
may motivate them to locate close to each other in order to access supplies and facilitate infor-
mation exchange. We exclude bank-centered or "horizontal' groups which are largely defined
by financial linkages and tend to behave more like diversified conglomerates. Since state borden
are rather arbitrary boundaries for the extent of agglomeration effects, we created border-state
variantsofAUS, A, and A0 by summing the number of firms in adjacent states. These vari-
ables allow for the possibility that, for example, Indiana is attractive to widget manufacturera
not only because of the widget producers there but also because of widget producers in illinois.
Ohio, Michigan and Kentucky.
V RESULTS
Table 1 presents the agglomeration coefficients generated by maximum likelihood estimation of
equation (2). The estimation included state-specific constants which we omitted from the results
table- Column (1) provides the benchmark model estimates where we test whether Japanese
ventures emulate their American counterparts. This specification desdibes location choice when
country-of-origin effects are absent or the case where the number of U.S. firms acts as a proxy
for industry-specific endowment effects. The estimated coefficient reveals that Japanese firms
locate in regions where there are a relatively large number of U.S. establishments in the same
industry, If the error term is an independently drawn disturbance, the coefficient on inAUS
measuresthe impact of agglomeration on location choice. However, the endowment 'theory of
localization (described in Section II) suggests that the error term, ej. in equation (I), will be
correlated with AUS,inwhich case the coefficient on In AU$ will reflect endowment effects in
addition to agglomeration economies,
Columns (2) and (3) reveal a "follow-the-leader" pattern of Japanese investment that is
13Table 1: Agglomeration Effects on Location Choice
Dependent Variable: Location Choice




















































No. of Choosers 751. 751. 751 751 751
No. of Choices 34 34 34 34 34
Note: Conditional logit regression. estimated by "4'iiS likelihood. Standard e
ron in parentheses. Alternativespecificconstants were cployed in each a-
tisnation. Columns (4) and (5) were estimated with .ta*&sped*c time trends
a. well. A. correspond. to a stock of firm, operating in states it the be-
ginning of the year when the relevant ventures began operations. It includes
that venture. The superscripts /. US.sadC refer to Japanese plants in the
ventures 4-digit SIC, US establishments in the 4-digit SIC, and plants at least
50% owned by member, of the parent company's industry poup. .9(s) is the
set of states that border state a. Hence, the summation is the aggregate stock
in adjacent states.
14difficult to interpret as anything other than agglomeration effects. The location of Japanese
investments is significantly influenced by the locations of previous Japanese investments in the
same industry and/or keiretsu. The largercoefficientson the Japanese agglomeration vari-
ables suggest that the attractive effect of prior Japanese investment exceeds that of prior U.S.
investment.5 The large significant coefficient on In A' corroborates our hypothesis that supply
relationships between Japanese firms and technological spillovers are stronger between members
of the same industrial keiretsu.
Adding the Japanese industry and group counts significantly improves the explanatory power
of the regression equation. The likelihood ratio test overwhelmingly rejects the hypothesis that
the four Japan-specific variables (within-state and border-state at' and A°) have no explanatory
power.6 Moreover, including these variables detracts little from the significance of the U.S.
variables. The following reasons cause us to believe that the estimated coefficients reflect more
than simple correlation between location decisions and unobserved state industry endowments.
To begin, we would expect the coefficients on the U.S. variables to capture this correlation.
If the same unobservables were responsible for the estimated effect on Japanese counts, they
would not result in the significant new information demonstrated by the !ik.i;hood ratio test.
Moreover, we would expect the Japanese variables to share the measured effect of the U.S.
variable in column (1) which they clearly do not.
We added the industrial group variable, A0, in column (3) to determine whether vertical
linkages might provide an additional impetus to Japanese firms' location decision beyond the
draw of previous investments in the same industry. For example, a firm that produces plastic
auto parts might be attracted to a state that has considerable auto production even if there were
'A likelihood ratio test of the hypothesis that the U.S. sad Japanese effects (within-state and horde-state)
are equal reject. at the 0.04 confidence level.
'The test statistic is 129 and the critical value for significance at the 0.005 level is 15.
15no concentration of plasticparts producers inthat state. Wealsohypothesized that member
firmsmight locatenear each otherto i-cap the benefits of shared infonnation. Column (3)
estimates show that group member activity provides a strong attractive force for investment
decisions.
Wetested analogous agglomeration measures which indicated border-state industry activity
by U.S. firms, Japanese firms, and kciretsizmembersin addition to the within-state agglom-
eration variables. The statistical significance of all three border-state variables indicate that
agglomeration externalities cross state boundaries, although, as one might expect, the mag-
nitude of the effect declines. While anecdotal accounts suggest that agglomeration benefits
operate over small geographic areas such as cities, our results suggest that they extend over
greater distances. A group of states becomes collectively more attractive through the activity of
each of its members, creating an industrial "cluster" that could extend for hundreds of miles.7
One potential problem for interpreting the effect of A"' is that the Japanese ventures, for the
most part, started more recently than the American ones. Because most Japanese investments
occurred later, it is possible that relative levels of infrastructure or factor prices changed from
those prevailing at the time U.S. firms made their location decisions. The apparent Japanese
agglomeration might then arise solely as a response to the new conditions faced by the Japanese
firms when they made their investments.8
We allow for changes in the relative attractiveness of states by adding state-specific time
trends.9 This makes the model robust to trends affecting the relative attractiveness of a state in
the eyes of the average investor. Column (4) displays estimates of the agglomeration elasticities
'However, border-.tsite activity is not always dist.at,asit may involve odes like St. Louis that .tn4dle state
borders.
'Relocationcosts might generate tbeinertiaimplied byU.S.firm.' decisioc, to raiain locationswhere
environmental factors have become unfavorable. however, agglomeration effects could be at work — well.
'The appendix contains a derivation of these time trends slowing what forms of change they can sceomodate.
16when these state time trends are included.While a likelihood ratio test reveals that inclusion of
thetime trends adds significant explanatory power (p-value.005) tothe specification, they do
not affect the magnitude or the significanceof the coefficients on the agglomeration variables.
Therefore, alihough relative state attractiveness changed overthe 1980s, the measured Japanese
igglomeration effects do more than reflect trendsin the attractiveness of individual states.
To the extent that there are industry-specific effects, we need to provide acontrol for changes
that make a state more attractive during the sample period for certainindustries but not
others. We employ a variable cailcd USGROWTH which is the growthrate iii the number
of establishments in each industry-state between the 1982 and 1987census.t°Theinclusion of
USGROWTH should sharply diminish the significance of the Japanese agglomerationif the
latter variables simply reflect recent changes in industry-specificendowment effects. As shown in
column (5), USGRQWTH does not have a significant effect on locationchoice and its presence
has a negligible effect on the coefficients of the agglomerationvariables.
V-A Interpretation of Coefficients
Interpreting the magnitude of the coefficient estimates is notstraightforward in the logit model.
The ratios of the coefficients correspond to the ratios of parametersin the underlying production
function. Thus, in column (3), the elasticity of output with respectto border-state agglomera-
tion ranges between 43% and 67% of the elasticity with respect towithin-state agglomeration.
The question remains whether the within-state agglomerationeffects0.5O, 0.60, and 0.77—are
"large" numbers. One way to assess their magnitude is to expressthem as average probability
elasticities. The elasticity of the probability of a particular investorjchoosingstate iwith
1Deinitiontof isduimnea changed in 1987. To ma3e the 1982 and 1987 sales coapetibk,we atatedcomposite
industrydefinitions. For instance. 1977 SKi 2651 sad 2654 became StbcrSIC 2656 or 265? nader the 1987
classification system. For this case, we created a composite industry that isthe sum of 2651 sad 2654 for 1982
sad the .u of 2656 sad 2057 for 1987. USGROII'TH measures the powth rateof that composite iadnstry.
17respect to agglomeration variable .4 canbecalculated by differentiating equation (2).
OPr(js) A' - =
OkPr(js)
=a(l—PrQs)).
Summingover allchoosers (j)andchoices (s)weobtain the relationship between average prob-
ability elasticities and the coefficient estimate,6,.
= E =
j=I3=1
Since S, the number of choices. equals 34 in the estimations, elasticities can be obtained by
multiplying the estimated coefficient by 0.97. The average probability elasticities indicate that
for the average state increasing its stock of establishments in some industry by 10% would
increase its likeLihood of being chosen by a subsequent investor in that industry by 5% to 6%.
Adding the very first Japanese plant in an industry raises the attractiveness of that state to
other firms in the industry by 50%.
Thus far, we have shown that the coefficients we interpret as agglomeration effects are
very signficant statisticallyandthat agglomeration appears to increase the attractiveness of
a location by a respectable percentage. However, we have not answered the question which
should be of great concern to policy makers: If financial incentives succeed in attracting an
initial investment, will that set in motion cumulative effects that will be strong enough to
have a substantial impact on the location choices of subsequent investments? To address this
question, we used the estimated coefficients to simulate the consequences of state actions that
attract investments.
Our simulation considers an hypothetical "representative" industry that initially has no
Japanese investment and a 1000 U.S. establishments distributed acres states in proportions
18equal to those of theaggregateU.S. manufacturing sector (as portrayed in Figure 1). The
simulation entailsthesequential entry of 30 Japanese plants. Each one chooses alocationbased
onstate characteristics (including location decisions of previous investments) anda Type I
ExtremeValue independent random shock. This givesriseto abaseline allocation of investments
acrossstates. We compare this baseline to an alternative scenario in which the simulation assigns
the first plant to a predetermined state and allows the following 29 investments to choose states
in response to the exact same pattern of disturbance terms. This allows us to measure the long
run impact for each state of attracting the first investment. We repeat the experiment 100 times
and compute the average outcome.
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1
Baseline Allocation (N=30)
•:The Xc. shows the average sumber (scion 100 separate eimuIatioa run.) of invutaeat. that each state
attacta. The V-usia shows the average increase in inveatments attracted the fiat iavestment vat assigned to
the state in questios.
Figure 2 depicts the distribution of the 30 Japanese investments both in the presence and
19absence of state policies securing initial investments. The horizontal axis measures the number
of investments in each state in the "baseline" case where the Japanese plants locate based on
the state characteristics and a random error term. The vertical axis shows the gross investment
yield of actions that ensure the first investor locates in a particular state. The gross yield
includes the first investment plus any changes in subsequent location decisions resulting from
assigning this investment to the state in question)t The figure indicates that states with
manufacturing concentrations or estimated "desirable" state-specific effects such as Georgia,
Ohio, and California attract the most investment, an average of about three investments each.
Moreover, these states also receive the the highest gross yields. While the simulation reveals
that state policies that attract initial investments usually lead to further investment in that
state, subsequent investment related to agglomeration is fairly limited. Across the 34 states
we consider, the gross yieldonpolicies ensuring that the first of 30 Japanese investors locate
a particular state is only 1.4 investments. For "attractive" states, the payoff is higher—2.57 for
Georgia and 2.25 (or California. Over the 100 trials, these states occasionally gained as many as
8 or 10 investments. On the other hand for "unattractive" states, attracting the initial investor
yielded little beyond that particular investment.
V-B Robustness Issues
Conditional logit estimation relies on the assumption of identical independent error terms in
equation (1). If these assumptions are not met in the data, a violation of the independence of ir-
relevant alternatives (hA) property will lead to biased estimates)2 The inclusion of alternative-
"In some trials, the gnu yield for a particular .tate was tao or evn negative. There were trial, where the
initial investment located in the state in question in the baseline esse so the nerd.. yielded no net change. In
other trials relocating the first investment alter, ensuing contests for investment such that the state's competition
for certain investments is made stronger and the state no longer attracts the investments that it did in the baseline
"The HA property, which is necessary for unbiased conditional logit estimation. implies that the relative
probabilityof choosingtwoalternatives(states) doesnot dependon the availability or charactaistics of other
20specific constant terms (state dummy variables) removes some forms of bias that might arise.
Train(1984.p. 18-25) shows that addingalternative-specificconstant terms—state effects in
this study—allows for the use of a conditional logit specification in the presence of some forms
of hA violation. Specifically, our model is valid as long as investors have uniform perceptions of
the substitutability between states. However, unobserved characteristics of the choosers aught
make some choices closer substitutes in the eyes of certain investors than other choices. Such
unobserved heterogeneity will lead to a violation of ILk.'3 Consequently, the coefficient estimates
will depend critically on the sample of choosers and choices. To investigate whether our results
are robust, we reestimate the model using a variety of sub-samples, where each sub-sample
is chosen to remove a potential violation of the independence assumption. We find that the
coefficients on the parameters of primary interest remain remarkably stable.
We selected four groups of states to remove from the sample: the Pacific, the Rust Belt, the
Sun Belt, and the South. In each of these regions, states might have certain characteristics in
common that could lead to violations of the hA assumption. Pacific states (Alaska, Washington,
Oregon, and California) have lower transportation costs to Japan. Rust Belt states (Illinois,
Indiana. Ohio, Michigan, Wisconsin, Pennsylvania. New Jersey, New York, Connecticut, Mas-
sachusetts, and Maryland) tend to have relatively high unionization rates and have a declining
share of the nation's population. Sun Belt states (California, Arizona, Nevada, Texas, and
Florida), on the other hand, have experienced rapid population growth over the last decade.
Southern states (Georgia, South Carolina, Mississippi, and Alabama) have low unionization
rates and have enjoyed rapid growth of manufacturing. The Ilk problem does not arise from
alternatives. For instance, in a choice between three states—A, B. sad C—Pr(A)/Pr(B) is independent of the
chazactenstic. of state C. Suppose, however, that in reality investors aniformly view states C sad B a. dose
substitutes, while they regard A as substantially inferior to either. An unobserved improvement in C would
increase Pr(A)/Pr(B).
"Conditional proôit models show for correlated error term.. However, they are coaputatiocally Sensible with
such a large set of choices.
21the regional differences by themselves. If low uniouization raised the attractiveness of Southern
states to all Japanese investors, this effect would show up in the state-specific constants. In-
stead. the concei-n is that a subset of the investors have strong opposition (or attraction) to some
characteristic conuzion to a group of states. Since we generally cannot observe such sentiments,
they will generate correlated error terms.
Table 2: Independence from Irrelevant Alternatives?
Dependent Variable: Location Choice










































































No. of Chooser, 609 462 612 654 518 729
No. of Choices 30 23 29 30 34 33
Note: Coaditson4 logit regression. estimated by maaiw,.m lik.lihood. St.adnd cr0.. is psienthes...
Coefficieiii. for alteru.tive-.pecific constaat. tie not r.port.d. Danition. of BBS nzaLJ caa
be found in the note below Figure 1.No P.ci$c ezcludei AK, CA, OR, sad WA. "No Bait'
exclude.CT, IL, IN.MA, MD.Ml. OH. PA.NJ, NY, WI. "No Sun' ocludes AZ, CA, FL., NV,
TX.'NoSouth' excludes AL, GA, MS.SC. Fisb/Wood' rda.to SIC.2091.2092, 2421, 2426
sad2436.
The results of estimating the model with the restricted sample. an shown in columns (1)-(4)
22in Table 2. The statistical significance and approximate magnitude of U.S. and Japanese within-
state industry-activity effects holds up well over four entirely different choice sets, although
there is some variation in the estimates of the border-state effects. In particular, the within-
state agglomeration measures retain the same levels of statistical significance across the four
'samples.'4 An alternative approach is to retain the full choice set while eliminating groups of
similar investors. Columns (5) and (6) portray estimates after the elimination of ventures for
which there are reasons to expect correlated error terms that will lead to violations of the hA
assumption: auto-related plants and plants involved in fish or timber processing.
Smith and Florida (1092) show that the location of large Japanese automobile assembly
plants figured prominently in the location decisions of the over 200 subsequent investments by
auto parts companies. While these clusters might indeed be partly attributable to Japanese
agglomeration externalities, they also could be a source of correlated errors among states with
assembly plants. Column (5) shows the results of estimated the model after eliminating auto-
related investments.15 Again, the results are generally robust to restriction of the sample. The
within-state group variable does, however, become insignificant, suggesting that the estimated
keiretsu effect arises primarily from activity in the auto industry.
The last restricted sample eliminates two industries that draw heavily on local natural
resources. Japanese firms processing canned and frozen fish are heavily concentrated in Alaska
whereas the corresponding U.S. industry was dispersed among various coastal states. Similarly,
the concentration of Japanese lumber firms in Washington deviates from the U.S. industry
pattern. We speculated that these Japanese ventures might be oriented towards exporting their
"This approachtothe hA problem was inspired by formal tatproposedis E"" and McFadden (1964).
We did not cositnict the test statistics because our use of .lternative-spedfic eoastaats asses the samba of
parameters to vary aaoss specifications Also, since their tests are only valid under the maintained assumption of
ILk is, the restricted choice set, we felt that it would be more instructive to view the reduced-sample timatioas
as informal tests of robustness.
"Auto parts investments span over forty 4-digit SIC codes. However, the product descriptions provided by the
Jopan Economic !nstitule generally make it clear which plains serve the autoiaduastsy.
23products back to Japan. This unobserved intention could lead to correlated errors terms amor.
states chosen by finns in these industries. Column (6) shows the result of eliminating ventures in
canned and frozen fish and lumber industries from the sample. While the estimated coefficients
on the within-state U.S. and Japanese counts fail somewhat, all the effects remain positive and
significant.'6
The coefficient estimates presented in Table 2 demonstrate that our primary results continue
to hold, regardless of the imposed sample restrictions. Both U.S. and Japanese within-state
manufacturing activity attract Japanese investment in the same industry,the most part,
border activity also appears to be an attracting force. The group activity results, however,
appear less robust to changes in the sample. In particular, they seem to disappear altogether
with the removal of the auto-related investments. This finding could reflect the limitation of
using group affiliation to represent vertical linkages for groups other than those headed by
automobile producers. While firms in auto groups almost certainly produce related products,
other group affiliations might be among firms who produce completely different products. For
example, in the case of electronics, many group companies were created as spinoffs into new
product lines and they have few actual business dealings with other group members.'7 The
insignificance of group agglomeration in the non-auto sample also indicates that group companies
may not need to locate foreign affiliates close to each other in order to facilitate information
exchange.
"The fact that 9 out of 12 Japanese wood-products manufacturers chose Washington or North Carolina is
hard to reconcile with • resource-driven stoi' given that Oregon and Virginia, which have large count, of U.S.
establishments, received no Japanese investment. However, we wanted to make sure that this hib1y concentrated
industsy was not driving our result..
See Gerlach (1993). A case in point is Fanuc which produce. numerically controlled machine tool, which
differsubstantially (rotathe product. of other members of the P\ijitsu soup.
24VI CONCLUSIONS
The geographical distribution of Japanese investments in the 1980's demonstrates the impor-
tance of agglomeration economies in location decisions. Our estimates suggest that a state
which experiences a 10 percent increase in any of our agglomeration measures increases its
probability of futureselection by 5 to 7 percent.This finding emerges even when we control for
state effects, state time trends, and industry-level stocks and flows of U.S. investment. Japanese
investors prefer to site their plants in areas where they find concentrations of previous Japanese
investments in the same industry and, for auto-related firms, the previous investments made by
keirctsuaffiliates.These results do not arise through deliberate selection of industries thought to
exhibit agglomeration effects. Instead, they figure prominently in a sample including a diverse
set of industries. Even the exclusion of heavily localized industries such as autos and sawmills
does not alter the basic findings. In addition, we confirm the hypothesis that state borders do
not define the relevant economic boundaries for agglomeration effects; border-state activity has
up to two-thirds of the attractive power of in-state activity.
Since Japan-specific agglomeration appears to exert a strong influenàe on location decisions,
it suggests that neither natural resources nor specialized labour drive location choice by them-
selves. This is because those factors should be captured in the pattern of U.& establishment
agglomeration. Hence, the finding of strong attraction between Japanese firms points towards
the importance of explanations involving intermediate inputs and pure technological spillovcn.
In 1985 Kentucky offered an incentive package in excess of $300 million to attract a Toyota
manufacturing plant. While states do not extend such massive packages frequently, substantial
efforts to lure manufacturing investments are common. The question arises whether the results
in this paper provide a rationale for policies of this kind. Agglomeration effects imply that
any benefits received from attracting a single investment will be magnified by an increased
25probability of attractingsubsequentsimilar investments. However, simulation results indicate
that this subsequent investment may be small or negligible,especiallyfor states that Japanese
investors perceived as relatively unattractive. Furthermore, the winners in bidding wars between
state governments may find that the price paid in terms of subsidies and added infrastructure
may offset any gain derived from attracting a foreign manufacturer.
A Appendix: The Conditional Logit Model of Location Choice
This appendix derives the profit function expressed in equation (1) and discusses the restric-
tiveness of the assumptions that underlie the empirical work.
The following three sets of variables enter the production function.
• Agglomeration Effects: A1, Economic activity in an area that generates positive exter-
nalities for nearby firms engaged in similar activities.
• Infrastructure Measures: i, Inputs available in fired supply to all firms located in the
state, e.g. highway miles. port capacity, climate, research universities.
• Priced Variable Inputs: ic, Input whose levels are chosen to minimize costs given the
prices that prevail in each state, e.g. skilled and unskilled labor, raw materials, energy.
By assuming that the investor has a production function of the Cobb-Douglas form (where
the inputs are defined in the body of the paper), we obtain a final apecification that is linear in
the parameters and where coefficient estimates can be interpreted as probability elasticities.
q =A'.AOKKJf1 . . .jfs'i" .x7j'exp(s). (3)
The last term, p, captures state- and investment-specific heterogeneity in total factorpro-
26ductivity.
Define p as the outputprice,w as the price of variable input X1, andletE1—
If inputs are set to minimize cost, and output is set to equate marginal cost with the output
price and p>0,the profitfunction is
it= (A" - - - AfJ'3' j$L.t .w;1Mpexp(,))., (4)
where C is a complicated function of the y parameters.
Takingnatural logs andmultiplyingby p we obtain
K I, M
pint = +EaAi+Efl,InI—E',jlnwe+lnp+p. (5)
i=I
This equation specifies profits according to a form amenable to conditional logit estimation
as the profit associated with locating plant j in state a is a (unction of the characteristics of
the state. The finn chooses state a if the profits for locating there exceed those associated with
alternative locations. We drop ln from the profitability equation since adding a constant to
the profits in each location does not affect the comparison of profits and consequently will not
affect choice probabilities.
Assume that infrastructure measures, I,andinput prices. w, vary aaoss states (choices are
indexed by a) but not across investments( Choosers are indexed by j). In that case, infrastructure
variables and input prices can be combined into a single indicator of the attractiveness of state




27where the upper bar" variables—-li, 5, p, and i—are the average of the N Japanese investments.
Now, profitabilityfor investment jinstates dependsona stateeffect, theagglomeration




The error term isdefined as follows:
1. M
—$,)lnhi.— — 'fi) law1. + (Inp,. — lap.) + (ps. — P.) (8)
1=1 1=1
Thiserror term measuresdeviations from the average Japanese investor's inputelasticities,
output price, and total factor productivity in each state. The divergences from the average
input elasticities ale weighted by the corresponding factor price or infrastructure level in that
state. if this error termis distributedas a Type I Extreme Value independent random variable,
theparameters inequation (1) can be estimated using conditional logit.
We haveassumed Cobb-Douglas production functionsand a Type I ExtremeValue error
term,webelieve ourresults will hold up under more general conditions.Withrespecttothe
productionfunction, the Cobb-Douglas form is convenient because it yields a multiplicative
profit function. However, our specification would remain appropriate in other forms as long as
the profit function can be expressed as
=
whereyQand/4) are functions of the input prices, infrastructure and agglomeration variables:
W, I, and A. In that case, the state effect, 8, in equation (2) will be an estimateoflng(W,,I.)
28and E1 °InA)1 willcorrespondto a first-order logarithmic approximation of an arbitrary
continuous function 4(A23).
With respect to the error term, McFadden (1974) has demonstrated that the extreme value
distribution, F(c,3) =exp[—exp(—c14J, is the only one that will yield the logit form. However,
Hausman and Wise (1978) found that the conditional probit, assuming an independent normal
distribution,produces very similar results to the conditional logit)8 Since the normal distribu-
tion is known to be a good approximation for a number of continuous distributions, this finding
suggests the computational gains provided by the conditional logit formulation probably do not
cause a major loss in robustness as long as the independence assunption is not violated.
The state-specific time trends arc derived in the following manner. Denote the initial (1979)
value of infrastructure variable or factor price i in state s asor w. Assume that in-
frastructure and wages grew (or declined) at constant rates, v and q, during the invest-
ment period (1980-1992). Then, for investment jthatoccurs in year t, !J,=
= w6,exp(qt,). Under these assumptions, equation (7) becomes
K
pIn r. =.o+ a9,t1 + EaIn A, + ,
whereA9, sf131v+ Eti 7i'i.
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